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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS
Panel Coordinator:

Nina Totenberg, legal correspondent
for National Public Radio

Panelists:

Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Wisconsin
Supreme Court
Judge Patricia Wald, Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia
Jesse H. Choper, Dean, Boalt Hall
School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley
John Hart Ely, Dean, Stanford University School of Law

The Constitutional Law Panel of the NA WJ brought together distinguished theoreticians and practitioners of judicial
review. Deans Choper and Ely presented abbreviated versions of
their recently published theories* on the legitimacy of judicial
review in a democratic society. Justice Abrahamson and Judge
Wald responded with observations on the practical applications
of state and federal constitutional principles to the cases they
must adjudicate daily.
Deans Ely and Choper both contend that there is an inherent dissonance between our democratic form of representative
government and the power of the Supreme Court to overturn
legislation or adjudicate conflicts between the political branches.
As a totally appointed body, the Supreme Court is not by definition politically responsible and ought to confine itself to safeguarding the rights and interests of those groups who are not
well represented in the electoral process-minorities and the politically and economically disadvantaged.
Dean Choper would have the Supreme Court deny review of
all claims based on federalism. He sees no need for review of
federal statutes which allegedly violate states' rights because
state interests are adequately represented by Congress which
created the disputed legislation. Likewise, Dean Choper would
*
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not have the Supreme Court act as a referee in power struggles
between Congress and the President. Both political entities are
adequately armed to defend against the other's invasion of its
prerogatives.
The proper exercise of judicial reVIew by the Supreme
Court, according to Dean Choper, is in the area of individual
rights, where the Court must act to preserve and protect the
rights of the under-represented. Analogously, Dean Choper
urges judicial review where the executive or legislative branches
seek to curtail the power of the courts. Because the federal
courts are also outside the electoral process and therefore not
represented, they must be allowed to guard against incursions
into their proper authority by the other branches.
Dean Ely perceives the evolution of constitutional law since
Reconstruction as having had one basic theme: extending fuller
and more equal participation in the political process to previously unrepresented groups. The Supreme Court's sole legitimate function according to this thesis is to assure that government does not so exercise its majoritarian mandate as to
discriminate arbitrarily or invidiously against minorities.
Since the basis of individual rights' protection is derived
from somewhat inchoate constitutional language-the Equal
Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the 14th
Amendment, for example-the most important and burdensome
task of the Supreme Court is to give content to the words of the
document. There have been two traditional approaches to the
problem of constitutional interpretation: one would look to the
intent of the Framers and limit the operation of the document
to its eighteenth century mandate; the other would identify
traditional socio-political values and seek to uphold them by extending constitutional protection to rights and values so identified. Dean Ely sees both these approaches as offensive to the
democratic ideal, the former because it delegates power to persons long-since dead and the latter because it is too vulnerable
to the individual biases of judges. Instead, he proposes a middle
ground between strict and broad construction that is basically
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM
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an elaboration of the Carolene Products· footnote, to wit, courts
must protect the politically disadvantaged against oppression by
the majority. When the court exercises judicial review in the
context of individual rights, its anti-democratic quality is minimized. Full and equal participation for minorities cannot be entrusted to elected officials since it may be in their self-interest to
keep certain groups out of the political process, opening up the
possibility of discrimination by electoral mandate.
Justice Abrahamson and Judge Wald made the following remarks in response to Deans Ely and Choper's presentations.
JUDICIAL REVIEW - THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY AND CERTAINTY
(NOTES FROM THE TRENCHES)

Judge Patricia Wald, Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia
I

I will begin by being perfectly honest with you. I don't lay
claim to any scholarly background in this field. I don't even hail
from academia. I did, however, spend a week or two at the end
of the summer in a more or less hit-or-miss foray into the vast
literature of judicial review, including Dean Ely's and Dean
Choper's writings (some of them). I can't pretend to have absorbed it all; I felt somewhat like the bar mitzvah boy in the
shul with the Talmudic scholars. At times, I was reminded of
Herman Wouk's comment about the U.S. Navy-judicial review
must be "a system designed by geniuses to be carried out by
idiots." I do not suggest we judges are idiots, but I do admit that
in deciding several hundred cases a year-even for us appellate
types-(1) we don't get time to keep as current as perhaps we
should with the law reviewers and jurisprudential thinkers; and
(2) we probably don't have enough time on each case to figure
out how to apply the theories, even if we could decide which
ones to accept or reject. It may be, as the con man hero of The
Music Man preached (I confess, in my spare time I often go to
the movies instead of reading law reviews), you just have to
think "restraint" or "norms" or "interpretativist" or "processed1.

u.s. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 nA (1938).
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based" values, and the music will come out right, but I'm
dubious.
I am not being altogether cute about this nor-God
knows-contemptuous of the very considerable creativity that is
encapsuled in these various theories of the proper functions and
scope of judicial review. I also believe the exercise has a worthwhile by-product as a counter to the periodic-and not always
intellectually honest-tirades about judicial restraint and judicial activism that pepper our politics and do affect individual
judge's selections, evaluations, and perhaps, in elective states,
. even tenure. At a more profound level, any institution including
the judiciary should always be concerned with the legitimacy of
its actions and the framework within which it properly functions, particularly in a democracy.
I do believe, however, that the jurisprudence of judicial review is formidable, and I think, in its present form, not very susceptible to immediate application by practicing judges (at least
not on the so-called "inferior" courts which all of us inhabit). I
will quote you one paragraph as an illustration, not for the validity of its remarks, certainly, but only to illustrate the diversity
and elusiveness of the guidelines we are called upon to implement in our decisions:
Professor Michaelson has devoted much of his academic career to cementing a union between the
distributional patterns of the modern welfare
state and the federal constitution. Professor Karst
would guarantee a whole range of nontextually
based rights against government to ensure "the
dignity of full membership in society," which, he
asserts, inheres in the "right of equal citizenship."
Professor Fiss argues that the courts should give
"concrete meaning and application" to those values that "give our society an identity and inner
coherence [and] its distinctive public morality."
Professor Dworkin charges the courts with enforcing our "constitutional morality," namely, the
moral principles "presupposed by the law and institutions of the community." Professor Perry
sees the court as having a "prophetic" role in deWOMEN'S LAW FORUM
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veloping moral standards in a "dialectical relationship" with congress, from which he sees
emerging a "more mature" political morality. Professor Richards urges that the court apply the
contractarian moral theory of Professor Rawls' A
Theory of Justice to constitutional questions.
Professor Alfange tells us that the court should
"translate . . . the national will into constitutional terms." Professor White's urging that the
courts invoke "reasons that appeal to deeply embedded cultural values" is echoed in Professor
Lupu's invitation that the court protect those
fundamental values "that have a solid underpinning in our historical traditions." Dean Sandalow
describes constitutional law as "the means by
which we express the values that we hold to be
fundamental in the operations of government."
Professor Brest summarizes the view of many
when he states that "constitutional adjudication
should enforce those ... values which are fundamental to our society." So doing, Professor Brest
states, will "contribute to the well being of our society-or more narrowly, to the ends of constitutional government." So it goes.

That was from a discussion by Professor Monaghan for the noninterpretive school criticizing the interpretive school. His own
non-interpretive friends, I might add, are not necessarily easier
to follow; although they do have the merit of simplicity-we
judges are urged not to look beyond the words in the document,
or in some cases, the words the drafters of the documents said
elsewhere, but at least no further than the era in which the
Framers of the constitution lived.
All of this is by way of saying that I am not at all sure that
the debate among the judicial review jurisprudentialists is really
aimed at affecting the behavior of ordinary judges at all, although they constantly talk about us, and of course every case
that the Supreme Court eventually decides has to pass through
one of our courts.
Nonetheless, the quintessential judicial review question of
whether something done by the executive or Congress or the
state (not often for us because we live in that non-state, the DisPublished by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
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trict of Columbia) violates the Constitution comes to us rarely. I
venture to guess that out of 600 cases decided last year in our
court, only a few (in fact I can think of only one or two last term
and only three the term before) involved a serious frontal attack
on the constitutionality of a congressional enactment or an executive action. And even though the Supreme Court grinds out 150
or so opinions each term, it is interesting that most of the articles and books arguing about judicial review use as their conversation pieces only a handful of cases: Brown v. Board,2 Roe v.
Wade,3 the death penalty cases, Baker v. Carr,4 perhaps the
school prayer and legislative veto cases, along with a few contrasts from the heyday of the 30s-Loehner/' Hammer v. Daggenhart,6 and Carter v. Carter Coal CO.7 The point is simple:
constitutional cases for most federal judges are a rarity-gourmet fare, definitely not the bread and butter of our
everyday worklives.
II

My second point is that few judges I know reach out for or
even want to decide constitutional issues. Such reticence does
not stem from innate humility alone; but from a weary recognition that anytime you reverse some governmental action on constitutional grounds, it almost inevitably means en bane review,
or certiorari granted and probable reversal. The prognosis, of
course, is quite different if you decide that challenged action is
constitutional. I suggest there is institutionally and experien-.
tially a very strong built-in bias in the lower courts against holding laws or actions violative of the federal constitution. I note
that in the last two en banes our D.C. Circuit sent up there, in
which we held warrantless search of closed containers in
automobiles by police unconstitutional under the fourth amendmentS and congressional action allowing veterans organizations,
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

349 u.S. 294 (1955).
410 u.S. 113 (1973).
369 u.S. 186 (1962).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Ross v. United States, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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but no one else, unlimited use of tax deductible contributions
for lobbying purposes unconstitutional under the equal protection clause,9 we were promptly reversed; the third one-striking
down regulations prohibiting sleeping in Lafayette Park as part
of a demonstration for homeless people has been granted certiorari, stayed, and a third reversal may be waiting in the wings. 1o
In over four years on the court, in my memory, except for a piggyback on the legislative veto controversy, only once has a court
in our circuit held a governmental action unconstitutional, and
had that decision survive, and then only by a 4-4 vote because of
Justice O'Connor's abstention.
As a matter of fact, in last year's Supreme Court product I
could find only six or so invalidations on constitutional grounds
of state or federal laws (not including variations on the death
penalty requirements and a few tax cases). And there were several reversals of circuit court decisions holding state or federal
laws unconstitutional. But it's worth taking a look at an example in both categories in terms of our theories of judicial review.

Marsh v. Chambers l l decided that the 200 year-old-practice
of state legislatures paying chaplains for opening prayers was
constitutional, although the Tenth Circuit, using the usual tests
for establishment clause violations, had said it was not. Legislative prayers, the Court said, are "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country,"12 and the Framers who wrote
the constitution contemporaneously voted to pay their chaplain.
"Their actions revealed their intent."ls In response to the argument that this was the opening wedge, the Court emphasized
that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability
and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere
shadow";14 no threat exists "while this Court sits."lli Justice
Brennan was not so easily comforted. He pointed out that there
was no attempt by the majority to justify this practice under
9. Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir.
1981) rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
10. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
cert. granted 104 S. Ct. 65 (1983).
11. 51 U.S.L.W. 5162 (1983).
12. [d. at 5163.
13. [d. at 5164.
14. [d. at 5165.
15. [d.
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ordinary tests for establishment clause violations: it merely
carved out an historical exception to the first amendment prohibition. He questioned the assumption the Framers wouldn't
have authorized inconsistent practices:
Legislators influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment, the pressures of constituents
and colleagues, and the press of business, do not
always pass sober constitutional judgment on
every piece of legislation they enact, and this
must be assumed to be as true of the members of
the First Congress as any other. IS

I guess this is a noninterpretive decision-or is it? I don't
think it's textual. Justice Brennan doesn't seem to place as
much faith in the legislature as Dean Ely. Maybe the Court
shouldn't have taken it at all, since it was a political question.
My own reaction is everyone wanted the question settled once
and for all, and now it is. Most people knew how it would come
.
out, and they're relieved.
Now let's compare a case where the Supreme Court did
overturn a law: the legislative veto case. Chief Justice Burger began with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. 17
"Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts"lS-but "by the
same token, the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it."19 (Since 1932, 295 congressional
vetoes have been inserted into 195 statutes.) The opinion's analysis is primarily textual-all legislation must be passed by both
Houses and presented to the President. It was the Congress' arbitrary use of the legislative power that gave rise to the device of
the presidential veto. Bicameralism was another check on that
power. "Art. 1, sec. 7 represents the Framers' decision that the
legislative power . . . be exercised in accord with a single finely
16. [d. at 5170-71.

17. I.N.S. v. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
18. [d. at 2780.
19. [d. at 2780-81.
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wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. "20 Recognizing,
however, that not "every action taken by either House [is] subject to the bicameralism and requirements of Article I, whether
actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of
legislative power, depends not on their form but upon whether
they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect."21 Finding the action in Chadha
to be essentially legislative, the result came easily. When the
Framers wanted to permit one House to act alone, as in impeachment, confirmation, and ratification, it said so.
So, based on the limited sample of one term, why does the
Court invoke judicial veto when it does, and vice versa. Except
for legislative veto-brewing for years in the courts-the instances are very circumscribed where the veto wipes out a legislative enactment. A church veto over taverns in Massachusetts;
demonstrating on the Supreme Court sidewalk; requiring I.D.
from suspicious persons in California-not very heady constitutional stuff. The abortion cases this year present a special situation. Basically the Court was policing: it went through a series of
state and local restrictions laid down on exercise of the basic
right it reaffirmed for a woman and her doctor to agree whether
to terminate a pregnancy; upheld some as permissible, denounced some as imposing an impermissibly heavy burden on
the exercise of the basic right. Historically there are about one
and a half cases a term that turn constitutional scholars on. This
year it was the legislative veto case.
And make no mistake-it was a bonzo. It will take years to
dig out of the ashes. That was a constitutional confrontation.
Was the Court right? Should it have decided the case-a separation of powers case? I think it had to-a variety of laws affecting
all sorts of people depended on a yes or no answer. Maybe there
was no process deficiency-how could there be, given the infinite
variety of matters involved in hundreds of legislative vetoes-no
insular minority-but there was a three decades' long conflict
between the two major branches of government simmering.
Surely it could not have been fought out on the streets, or with
United States Marshals, or with infinite inaction. In any society
20. [d. at 2784.
21. [d.
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as complicated and varied as ours, there must be an umpire-preferably one accepted by the bulk of parties and people.
We cannot keep moving unless there is one. Hence, I have a gut
skepticism that judicial review really can or should be contained
by narrow theories, most of which are incomprehensible to the
judges. Like chaplains, we are "part of the fabric of our society."22 As I perceive it, we have no rampant campaign to overturn state or federal laws passed by legislatures: quite the opposite. Courts are remarkably political, in the lower capital sense
of the word. When such a danger presents itself-as in the
30's-the chances are politics will triumph. Meanwhile, the
translation process of the jurisprudential theories into our daily
work is difficult if not impossible. Pragmatist that I am, I doubt
if judicial review really can be limited to process deficiencies, or
insular minorities, or even civil rights. We need the third
branch-underpaid, beholden to none, occasionally out of touch,
but always independent to cool a hyped-up society in its hottest
disputes. It's silly to pretend otherwise-there's no place else to
go.

III
This is not, however, to say that our only contact with constitutional issues in judicial review comes by way of such rare
direct challenges.
There is an intermediate group of cases-not large, but not
insignificant-where lower federal courts, confronted with the
potential of a possibly serious constitutional question, employ-as indeed, we have been instructed to-time-honored diversionary techniques to prevent head-on constitutional collisions. We decide non-constitutional questions first, so that we
may never have to reach the constitutional ones. The judge's notion of whether there is a serious constitutional question present
and what form it takes, of course, colors her judgment on the
statutory construction. Now, most of us legal realists recognize
that in so doing we are making implicit-sometimes ex22. Marsh v. Chambers, 51 U.S.L.W. 5164.

WOMEN'S LAW FORUM
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plicit-constitutional judgments about what that document will
or will not tolerate, in order to interpret the statute to avoid the
constitutional question. Thus, through the back door, we make a
pass at more constitutional questions than it may appear. But
the rules under which we operate when we are on our constitutional avoidance track are different from the conflicting themes
of constitutional adjudication so hotly debated in articles and
seminars.
Thus, the way in which we most often address fundamental
constitutional rights is through statutory construction. In this
way, our perceptions of fundamental rights and values are infused into our statutory interpretations, rather than made the
centerpiece of explicit constitutional decisions. But other facets
of the judicial review debate are muted in this context: the legitimacy of judicial review at all, the separation of powers problems
inherent in it, the strength of presumptions of legislative validity, hierarchies of values, insular minorities, and the Carolene
Products footnote. 23 In passing on the interpretation rather than
the validity per se of congressional enactments, we are cosmetically allied with Congress-enforcing its intent, not challenging
its constitutional judgment. And we have been entrusted with
the power of reviewing enforcement of its enactment by Congress itself. We are its designated agent, not an interloper. We
are engaged in a search for its intent, and under prevailing rules
of statutory construction, confined in that search to the words
that came out of its collective mouth: in hearings, committee reports, floor debates. Unlike the explorers of constitutional law,
we are not ordinarily allowed to run at will, foraying into the
Framers' private letters, newspapers of the times, and even contemporary eighteenth century thinkers in other lands. But still
we construe in the shadow of the Constitution and that shadow
can often account for the tilt that throws our construction one
way or the other.
So constitutional shadows put a thumb on the scale in favor
of a construction avoiding the question. Whether that rule of
statutory construction can or is being carried too far is another
question. Why, after all, should courts avoid legitimate constitutional questions through this device, if it means skewering true
23. 304

u.s.
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legislative intent?
Whether a decision involving an important or even "fundamental" right arises in or is decided by statutory construction or
constitutional adjudication seems to be a function of the lawyer's tactical judgment, the clarity, or even governmental level of
the legislative response which may, in turn, reflect the status of
the issue in the national agenda or in the agenda of the political
groups to which the political branches respond. It can-at least
at the Supreme Court level-also turn on the Court's choice of
responses-whether it wishes to turn from the constitutional issue and take refuge in a presumption of statutory construction
or bite the constitutional bullet. Lower federal courts, I believe,
generally hold back more from the constitutional course.

IV
What has all this to do with Professors Ely's and Choper's
themes on judicial review? For one thing, federal courts, at least,
strike down relatively few actions as unconstitutional but, when
they do, they are more apt to be executive than legislative actions. Executive actions, in my experience, tend to be less directly representative than those of Congress; executive decisions
reflect more bureaucratic input. Hence, we in the courts may be
less representation-enforcing even when we do declare actions of
the political branches unconstitutional than would first appear.
Second, most of the cases where we do perform constitutional adjudication do not involve declaration of new
rights-those decades may indeed be gone forever-the right to
an abortion, to one person one vote, to desegregate schools.
Rather, they involve constitutional balancing, deciding whether
the burden placed on the exercise of some right or power is justified by the strength of the interest asserted by the legislative or
executive branch. The questions that must be answered in the
balancing cases include: How heavy or light is the burden? If it
is light or trivial, stay on square one. If it is heavy, go on to
square two. How strong or weak is the state interest asserted to
justify the burden? How important in the rights' hierarchy is the
right or interest being burdened? The value judgments come in
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM
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answering those questions about heavy and light, very important
or only somewhat important. And, to be honest, the Supreme
Court (and other judges) do appear to use a wide range of
sources, including newspapers, undocumented assertions, history, sociology, common sense, medical lore, statistics, law reviews, almost anything printable, in making those qualitative
decisions.
This is not to say that concerns about judges overruling
majoritarian decisions do not apply to such decisions. In overruling a legislative or executive action because it places too heavy a
burden on a right, the Court is redoing a balance the other
branch presumably has already done. And when the decisions on
what is heavy, light, strong, or weak come from a potpourri of
informational sources, there will always be doubt that the judges
can do a better job of weighing them than the popularly elected
branches. Conceivably, they may do a less biased or more honest
weighing job, but certainly they have no inherent claim to competence in such scaling. Yet, this is the way the Supreme Court
has told us to do the job, and certainly if we look at the way
they do it, I agree it's not always reassuring. This year's abortion
cases are a classic illustration. The basic right to an abortion had
been declared long since, and that decision, the Court said,
would not be revisited.
Rather, what the Court had to decide was whether a wide
variety of state and local government responses attempting to
restrict and control the right went too far constitutionally in
burdening it. Among the regulations challenged were ones requiring hospitalization after the first trimester, notification and
consent by parents for unmarried minors, that the physician tell
the patient certain specified things including that the fetus is a
human being, that the unborn child may be viable, that abortion
is a major surgical procedure and may result in severe emotional
disturbance, a twenty-four-hour waiting period requirement, and
a requirement that fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane"
manner. Violations were criminally punishable.
One gets the distinct feeling from reading Justice Powell's
majority decision that the Court sensed that many of these restrictions were enacted in order to erode or even wipe out altogether the basic right. In that sense, it may have been a case of
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
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disingenuous legislation akin to strategems and weaseling on basic rights to erode school desegregation policies in the early civil
rights days of the 60's. Even if we are dealing with women, not
blacks, in abortion cases, and women have access to the political
process; still something sticks in the gut about presuming the
legislature has gone about its balancing conscientiously when the
results cry no. And indeed the Court was not particularly deferential in these cases to the legislative balance.
Several of the restrictions were struck down on what seems
to be a basis of common sense, common knowledge, accepted (in
some quarters) dogma; conversely, the dissents' howls of anguish
seemed equally based on individual preconceptions of how the
world works and how people and institutions will react. Neither
side offered any empirical proof of their assumptions.
In our court recently, we had to decide if restrictions on
signs five or ten feet, upheld by aluminum tubing, unduly burdened the acknowledged right to demonstrate in front of the
White House. Were it to be left entirely to legislative or executive discretion, a cumulation of such restrictions could at some
point make the right worthless-common sense tells us that. So
courts are left to do the eternal balancing act. My trouble with
the thrust of the representation reinforcement limitation is that
it forces courts to sit by and watch a hostile legislature or executive do away with a constitutionally declared right through the
device of restrictions.
COMMENTS

Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Wisconsin Supreme Court
I'm delighted to participate on this panel. Ordinarily, in interpreting writings like constitutional or statutory provisions or
appellate opinions, we have to guess at the Framers' intent. We
have with us today two framers, and they can set forth their own
intent. I think they must know how it feels to be interpreted
since they have been so well reviewed and discussed. I wonder if
they say to friends, as an appellate court judge sometimes says
from the bench, "Did I say that?"
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM
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I originally thought of coming up and saying, as Dean Ely
and perhaps Dean Choper hinted (or maybe they did more than
hint), that perhaps their works and this discussion have no value
for state court judges, other than as an interesting intellectual
exercise. But Judge Patel would be disappointed with such a response, and I thought the messages of these two deans have
meaning to more judges than just those on the United States
Supreme Court.
So I decided that I would give this more thought. I spent
$28.50 for Choper's book, $6.95 for Ely's book, and I, like Judge
Wald, xeroxed and read many, many pages of reviews and articles by scholars in the field of judicial review. As I read, I still
had the uncomfortable feeling that maybe this panel was not the
forum for a state judge. But a newspaper piece I read put the
two books into a special perspective.
Since I'm a populist, I always read the local newspapers-especially when they're delivered free of charge to the hotel room. A letter to the editor in yesterday's San Francisco
Chronicle raises the issue that the academy raises as to judicial
review, that is, the legitimacy of court action which appears to
be counter-majoritarian. But the letter raises the issue not in the
olympian field in which our two academicians write, namely judicial review under the federal Constitution by the highest court
of the United States, but in the everyday workings of a state
court interpreting state statutes. I read the letter (which some of
you may have read) not in terms of the merits of the case discussed by the letter writer, but as an example of a lay person's-I assume it's a lay person's-discussion of the issue of legitimacy of judicial decision making.
The letter is entitled, "A Just Society?" It reads as follows:
In a just society, where the courts bowed to the
will of the people [I think that's a reference to
majoritarianism] Archie Fain would not be allowed to walk the streets as a free man. He would
either be put in the gas chamber or he would face
life imprisonment.
In a just society-

The letter writer doesn't refer to our society as "democratic" as
the academicians do. Lay people talk about a just society. I do
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not think the word "just" appears often in the two books we are
talking about today. To continue with the letter:
In a just society, 62,000 people signing a petition to keep this convicted murderer in prison
would have an effect on the courts. But not in this
case, where the justices have ruled that 'public
outcry' is not sufficient reason to keep Fain in jail.
In a just society, the governor of California,
acting on executive privilege and with the will of
the people in mind, would be allowed to rescind
Fain's parole without interference by courts.
Fain's release is the worst miscarriage of justice and the democratic process I've ever
experienced. 24

The letter is an interesting commentary on what the writer
perceives as the judiciary functioning in a counter-majoritarian
way, a commentary not from an academician, not from a judge,
but from a representative of the people whom the judicial system serves. Now, we could discuss, but I won't, the merits of the
Fain case, the procedural posture of the case, and the rules of
statutory construction. The letter, however, raises a broader
question, for all of us, whether we be at the first level of a trial
court, at an intermediate appellate court, or at'the highest court
of the state or federal system. It is the question which I believe
underlies the Ely and Choper works: How do we judge, and what
is the legitimacy of our actions?
These two books concerning legitimacy of judicial action are
directed, unlike the letter, at judicial review by the United
States Supreme Court. Constitutional interpretation and the legitimacy of judicial review appear to come into vogue in academic discussions every twenty years or so. As we again question
the concept of judicial review in the 1980's and are concerned
about the power of the judiciary in this country, it is interesting
to note that our European colleagues are turning more and more
to the judiciary and to the adoption of judicial review.
24. San Francisco Chronicle. Oct. 8 1983. at 32. col. 4.
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Let me tell you why I think the two books, at one and the
same time, do and don't have something to say to the state
judge in her everyday world of judging.
The two authors pose the question of the legitimacy of judicial review in a democratic society on the grounds that judges
are not elected representatives of the people, and that judicial
decisions are final. These themes do not apply to many state
courts since, first, many state judges are elected and, second,
generally our decisions are not final.
I am a judge, elected statewide on a contested, nonpartisan
ballot. One can argue that I am a representative of the people. I,
like the legislator, come to office with a mandate from the people. This reasoning is not totally satisfactory. The nature of the
commitment I made when running for election differs from that
of the legislator. I did not promise, like a legislative candidate,
to support any group or any group's wishes in deciding an issue
that comes before the judiciary. I did not in my campaign explain my personal views on issues pending before the court or
the state, or explain my personal value system. I made a promise
to the people of the state that I would be a good judge; I promised I would be fair and would administer justice impartially; I
would obey and abide by and support the federal and state constitutions. Running for election I sounded very much the way a
nominee for a federal judgeship sounds in a Senate confirmation
hearing. I promised to interpret the law and abide by the
majoritarian view expressed in the statute unless contrary to the
Constitution. I promised to interpret the constitutions as written
and to abide by the doctrine of stare decisis. Although many
have commented that the legislative process is not an expression
of majority will, I cannot cast myself as a representative of the
people, as can a legislator who has run on a platform which the
people evaluate and review in terms of the legislator's individual
decisions on the merits of an issue.
Second, state court decisions are rarely final-not even the
decisions of the highest court of the state are necessarily final.
As long as the court is not final, according to the Ely-Choper
theses, the majoritarian democratic process can work. The court
may slow things down awhile, but the majority can still act to
overrule the court.
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As to the federal Constitution, I as a state court judge do, of
course, interpret the federal Constitution. State court decisions
on federal questions are not final-but they are important. Although it is popular to think that the United States Supreme
Court is protecting individual rights via the federal Constitution,
you know that trial judges, state and federal, protect individual
rights every day. State and federal judges deal with search 'and
seizure, as an example, much more frequently than does the
United States Supreme Court. The state courts touch the lives
of more people a day than the United States Supreme Court
does in the 150 to 200 cases it hears in a year.
As to the state constitution, our state court might very well
be the court of last resort. I might be final if the United States
Supreme Court really believes me when I write that I'm interpreting the state constitution, and the Court does not view me
as being devious and trying to avoid its review. In any event,
even if the state supreme court is final in its interpretation of
the state constitution, in many states, the people, by majority
rule, can overrule the court decision.
The major part of the state judge's job is to interpret and
apply state laws. It is my job to interpret state statutes, not
make state policy. The legislature sets forth the policy, I fill in
the cracks. Sometimes the cracks are large, sometimes they're
small. But in any event, the legislature can change the "fillings."
As to the common law, judge-made law, judges have broad
authority. And yet we're reviewable and reversible by the state
legislature.
In Choper and Ely terms, we state judges are not countermajoritarian because our decisions for the most part can be
changed, at least for future cases, by the majority acting through
the legislature.
I suggest, however, as Judge Wald did, that although it's interesting to look at the concept of judicial review in terms of a
court striking down, with finality, legislative and executive enactments on grounds of unconstitutionality-it's a very dramatic
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM
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event when the court strikes down the work of another
branch-this function of the courts has been stressed too much.
Invalidation of laws is the rare event, not the common event.
Thousands of laws are passed each year. Most of them are never
reviewed by any court; if they're reviewed, most of them are not
invalidated. We have also overemphasized the idea that the judicial decision is final. Studies show that even if a law is invalidated, the judicial decision declaring invalidity is not necessarily
final. Courts have been known to overrule earlier decisions.
There are a variety of ways a legislature may get around the
court's decision. An interesting article by Professor Janet S.
Lindgren in the Wisconsin Law Review 2fJ reports a study of the
interaction of the courts and the legislature in New York State
at the turn of the century. Professor Lindgren concludes that
the courts' overturning of state legislation was not generally a
final answer but was part of a dialogue between the court and
the legislature. The legislature continued to pass laws to see
what the dialogue would bring.
Although the Deans' discussions of the legitimacy of judicial
review on the basis of the nonrepresentative character of the
courts and the finality of judicial decisions have limited applicability to state judges (and may be challenged even as applied to
federal judges), these authors nevertheless have something important to tell state judges in helping us decide our day-to-day
cases.
We judges must recognize that every case is potentially one
of law reform and law revision and every litigation is, in a sense,
counter-majoritarian whether it's before an elected or an appointed judge. The judge, often without specific direction from
the legislature or prior case law, and always without discussion
with the people or the people's representatives, is making a decision binding on the parties and others who are not before the
court. I spoke previously about the court's task of filling in the
legislative cracks. Dean Ely objects to legislative delegation to
administrative agencies. He thinks the people should hold the
legislature's feet to the fire and make the democratically elected
branch of government set forth legislative policy in greater de25. Lindgren, Beyond Cases: Reconsidering Judicial Review, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 583
(1983).
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tail in legislative enactments. I suggest that after you deal with
enough legislation as a state court judge, you realize that the
legislature has frequently delegated the establishment of policy
without adequate guidelines not only to the administrative agencies but also to the courts. The legislature, unable to make up its
mind about key facets of the law or unable to muster a majority
either for or against a particular provision, omits a key provision
or leaves it ambiguous, thus delegating to state judges the task
of making policy in the guise of filling in the legislative cracks.
What principles guide the judge's interpretation of the statute
or common law or the application of the law to the facts?
Deans Ely and Choper caution us, and especially Dean Ely
tells us, that as judges we should not use our own personal value
system, our own personal predilections, in reaching our decisions. I agree. But it is easy to say that the judge should not
decide cases following her own sense of justice. It is easy to say
that the judge should not decide cases following what she believes is the popular view, except as the popular view may be
expressed by a jury instructed on the law by a judge. You will all
remember reading about a judge disciplined because he decided
cases on the basis of how the court-watchers seated in the courtroom voted on the case. The judge cannot be guided by the results of an opinion poll. In talking to the citizens of my state, I
have not found -anyone who wants me to decide any case according to popular community wisdom.
What is the judge to do when an agency or the chief executive acts in a manner that is very popular but contrary to the
statutes or constitution? Each of us knows how often we have
had to say: "I do not like the result I am reaching, but the statute or the constitution adopted by the people or their representatives requires that I so hold." The judge is at one and the same
time independent of the people and accountable to the people.
The judge's obligation is to decide cases according to principles generally and consistently applied. Defining these principles
is not easy. Deans Ely and Choper attempt to set forth general
principles to guide the United States Supreme Court in making
decisions, but the principles are not yet well enough developed,
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and they offer little guidance in deciding the actual cases that
come before the court.
We struggle to analyze the elements of decision making and
to improve the decision-making process and the judgments rendered. We can devise the best system and have the best set of
laws and principles, but the quality of justice depends ultimately
on the quality of the women and men who sit as judges. I understand the Deans to be telling us that our decision making should
not be based on our personal value system but on our sense of
an institutional value system. In deciding cases we judges must
be sensitive to the issues the Deans have raised-to the awesome
responsibility imposed on the judiciary; to our nonrepresentative
character; to the degree of finality of our decisions; to the importance of the independence of the judiciary working in a system
of democratic, majoritarian rule; and to the basic constitutional
concepts of protecting the minority in a pluralistic society and of
protecting the majority against the tyranny of the minority. It's
a big order for each of us to fill every day in every case. But I am
confident we shall try to fill it.
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